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EXPLORING THE INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
JUSTICE EFFORTS
INTRODUCTION
SUSANA SACOUTO
The 2015-2016 academic year marked the twentieth anniversary of
the War Crimes Research Office (WCRO) at American University
Washington College of Law. The Office was established in response
to a request for legal assistance from the first Chief Prosecutor of the
ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), Richard Goldstone. Faced with
bringing the first major international prosecutions since the
Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Trials following World War II,
the ad hoc criminal tribunals found themselves at the forefront of
international criminal law. The WCRO was originally created to
assist these tribunals with the kind of specialized legal research and
analysis that prosecuting cases of serious international crimes
requires.
In the twenty years since, the WCRO has worked with over fifteen
different courts, tribunals, and organizations involved in the
investigation and prosecution of serious international crimes, both at
the domestic and international level. With the participation of our
international law faculty, former and current WCRO staff, JD and
LLM students, and expert consultants, the WCRO has undertaken
more than 170 major research projects, including 19 public reports
analyzing issues that have arisen in the practice and jurisprudence of
the International Criminal Court (ICC).' The WCRO has also
* Director, War Crimes Research Office and Professorial Lecturer-in-Residence,
Washington College of Law (WCL)
1. See WCRO's ICC Legal Analysis and Education Project, https://www.
wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/icc-reports.cfm.
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launched several projects that have emerged as a result of our work
with the tribunals. For instance, the Gender and International
Criminal Law Project,2 created in partnership with WCL's Women
and the Law Program, makes available, free of charge, an online
collection of searchable documents from twelve tribunals dealing
with the prosecution of conflict-based sexual and gender-based
crimes.
During these past two decades, practitioners and scholars in this
field have seen an incredible number of advances. Media executives
have been held accountable for incitement to genocide. 3 High state
officials - including, most recently, former Congolese vice-president
Jean-Pierre Bemba - have been found guilty of crimes of sexual
violence, both as war crimes and crimes against humanity.4 Even
heads of state have been prosecuted and convicted for atrocity
crimes,' challenging traditional notions of head-of-state immunity.
For victims and the people on the frontlines, these advances have
been painstaking, but if we look back, the milestones of the last two
decades have been tremendous.
At the same time, we have seen a perceptible shift in the field.
The ad hoc tribunals created by the United Nations Security Council
in the 1990s to deal with the atrocities committed during the Balkans
conflict and the Rwanda genocide have closed or will be closing
shortly.6 Similarly, a number of the so-called "hybrid" tribunals -
2. See Washington College of Law, Gender Jurisprudence and International
Criminal Law Project, http://www.genderjurisprudence.org/.
3. See The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza,
Hassan Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, 28 November 2007
(affirming Trial Chamber's conviction of Ferdinand Nahimana and Hassan Ngeze
for direct and public incitement to commit genocide).
4. See The Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. Judgment
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, 21 March 2016.
5. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. No. SCSL-
03-01-A, Appeals Judgment, 26 September 2013 (upholding the Trial Chamber's
conviction of former Liberian President Charles Taylor for aiding and abetting and
planning war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out by the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Sierra
Leone).
6. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was officially closed in
December 2015. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda/United Nations
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals website, http://unictr.unmict.org/.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is scheduled to
[32:3606
INTRODUCTION
such as the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, set up with international support in
the countries where the atrocities occurred - have come to the end of
their respective mandates.
Significantly, we also now have a permanent international
criminal court. As a permanent institution, the ICC8 will obviously
play a critical role in the developing architecture of international
justice. However, the ICC has significant limitations. First, the
Rome Statute establishing the ICC does not yet enjoy universal
ratification.9 Second, the ICC can only deal with crimes committed
after the Statute came into force in 2002. 10 Third, it has a potentially
global mandate which it must carry out with finite resources,"
meaning that it can only realistically handle a limited number of
cases. While the ICC will sometimes be the only option for holding
certain perpetrators accountable - particularly where debilitated
national institutions or an absence of political will makes domestic
justice impossible - it cannot alone effect meaningful change in
close in December 2017. See President Agius addresses United Nations General
Assembly, Press Release, 9 November 2016, http://www.icty.org/en/
press/president-agius-addresses-united-nations-general-assembly.
7. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor ended its mandate in
May 2005. See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1573 (2004)
(extending the mandate for a final period of 6 months until 20 May 2005). The
Special Court for Sierra Leone closed in December 2013. See Special Court for
Sierra Leone/Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone website,
http://www.rscsl.org/.
8. The International Criminal Court was established by the Rome Statute. See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998 by the
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, entered into force 1 July 2002, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, Art. 61(1) (1998).
9. 124 of 195 states are parties to the Rome Statute. See The States Parties to
the Rome Statute, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/
the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20 rome%20statute.aspx.
10. See Rome Statute, Art. 11 (giving the court jurisdiction "only with respect
to crimes committed after the entry into force of th[e] Statute").
11. The Assembly of States Parties has approved an operational budget of
C141,600,000 for 2017. See Resolution of the Assembly of States Parties on the
proposed programme budget for 2017, the Working Capital Fund for 2017, the
scale of assessment for the apportionment of expenses of the International
Criminal Court, financing appropriations for 2017 and the Contingency Fund, ICC-
ASP/I 5/Res.1, adopted 24 November 2016. The Court currently has ten situations
under investigation and ten situations under preliminary examination. See ICC
Situations under Investigation, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx.
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countries where atrocities have occurred. For the ICC to make a
difference, it needs to be part of a broader set of accountability
efforts.
Thus, although much has been accomplished in the last 20 years,
practitioners and scholars in this field face a number of critical
questions. How can the ICC - and the international community more
broadly - effectively support accountability efforts beyond The
Hague? What do we need for "positive complementarity"1 2 to work?
What domestic or hybrid court models have worked best? What
lessons can we learn from external engagement in these models?
What are some of the cautionary tales? How can the ICC's
engagement with states be leveraged to improve domestic
prosecutions for crimes of conflict-based sexual and gender-based
violence, which - until relatively recently - had been ignored or
treated as secondary to other crimes? What are some of the
unintended consequences of "positive complementarity"? How do
we ensure ongoing and constructive engagement between the various
actors involved in the prosecution of serious crimes at the domestic
level, including not just justice system actors, but also donors and
civil society groups? The WCRO organized this conference,
Prosecuting Serious International Crimes: Exploring the
Intersections between International and Domestic Justice Efforts, in
collaboration with the American Bar Association Rule of Law
Initiative, the American Society of International Law, the American
Red Cross, and PluriCourts of the University of Oslo, to address
these very questions.
The conference, held on March 30, 2016, brought together thirty-
12. While the term "complementarity" does not appear anywhere in the Rome
Statute creating the ICC, the notion that the ICC should investigate and prosecute
crimes within its jurisdiction only when there is no State able and willing to do so
is one of the fundamental principles upon which the ICC was founded. See Rome
Statute, pmbl. ("[r]ecalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes"); id., Art. 17
(providing that a case will be inadmissible before the ICC if there is a State that is
willing and able to genuinely prosecute the case in its own courts). Since 2006, the
ICC's Office of the Prosecutor has embraced a more proactive interpretation of
complementarity, one that envisioned the Court as not only abstaining from taking
cases where a State was willing and able to prosecute, but as actively promoting
the domestic prosecution of international crimes. See Int'l Criminal Court, Office
of The Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 5 (14 September 2006).
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four speakers, including former Ambassador-at-Large for Global
Criminal Justice Stephen Rapp; International Center for Transitional
Justice President David Tolbert; Senior Trial Lawyer at the
International Criminal Court Anton Steynberg; former Norwegian
Public Prosecutor of Organized and Other Serious Crimes Siri
Frigaard; former Guatemalan Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz;
and American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative Director
Elizabeth Andersen, among others.13
Three speakers chose to contribute articles to this Symposium
issue. In the first article, University of Pittsburg Associate Professor
of Law Elena Baylis argues that internationalized criminal courts
should seek to influence justice efforts in post-conflict states but in a
more limited way than other proposals intended to expand the
domestic impact of international courts. She argues internationalized
courts should build on their core functions of investigating and trying
atrocity cases by shifting some resources toward making their
judgments more accessible and useful to national actors trying
atrocity cases, while at the same time outsourcing other aspects of
supporting national courts to the extensive rule of law networks that
operate in post-conflict countries.
In the second article, Tulane University Assistant Professor of
Political Science Geoff Dancy and University of Minnesota graduate
student Florencia Montal conduct an assessment of the ICC's impact
by analyzing both qualitative and quantitative data on the
relationship between the ICC and two outcomes: the prevention of
conflict and domestic legal change. With regard to violence
prevention, they find that ratification of the Rome Statute is
correlated with a higher probability that civil wars will end with
negotiation and with less repressive violence, fewer incidents of
mass killing of civilians, and fewer onsets of civil war. However,
they also caution that the ICC's direct involvement in specific
situations does not necessarily have "generalizable pacifying effects"
and that the deterrence impact of its interventions varies by
circumstance. On the second question, the authors conclude that
while some degree of legal change is inspired by the Rome Statute
13. The full conference program is available here:
https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/documents/WCRO20thAnniversaryConf
erenceProgramPublic.pdf.
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itself, and by direct consultation and monitoring on the part of the
Court, the effects that come from the Court's direct involvement in
certain situations, such as in the cases of Colombia, Democratic
Republic of Congo and Uganda, are restricted to those specific
contexts and broader influence should only be expected "as [the
Court's] place in the world's legal architecture solidifies."
Finally, in the third article, former ICTY prosecutor Daniela
Kravetz offers a critical examination of the progress made in
establishing accountability for sexual violence committed in the
internal conflicts of Peru, Guatemala, and Colombia. Her study
reveals that practitioners are increasingly applying international law
in their efforts to seek justice for conflict-based sexual violence, not
only by using international law to interpret domestic criminal
provisions, but also by using international precedent to better
understand the links between sexual violence and the broader context
of violence in the affected society, as well as how different forms of
sexual violence can be charged. She also observes that practitioners
are making progress in holding high-level leaders accountable for
sexual violence committed by their subordinates. Finally, her study
indicates that while criminal trials remain a key demand of victims,
truth-telling and historical memory processes that preceded trials
were critical in "surfacing the gendered dimensions of the conflicts
in each country, acknowledging neglected abuses and providing a
forum for victims to share their experiences of conflict," which in
turn strengthened the desire of victims to take their cases to court.
We hope that readers will agree that these articles make an
important contribution to the debate of pressing issues in
international criminal law, a field that is evolving rapidly in both
legal scholarship and practice.
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